The Only "Dangerous Wwapon" is the Human Mind, II
By Tom Creasing 
[email protected]
Exclusive to The Libertarian Enterprise
         In regard to 
my debut piece in The Libertarian Enterprise, V.S. in 
Nevada wrote:
          "[T]his 
thing reads like  Part I.'  Now, I'm waiting for:  Part 
II:  If I'd been in charge of the church at Waco, and I expected a 
federal assault, here's what I would have done.'"
         I don't have 
my dictionary of quotations to hand, but as I recall 
some strategist once pointed out that battles and wars aren't won by 
one side, they're lost by the other.  In other words, he who gives up 
first is the loser.  The essence of war, then, is to schedule and 
apply your resources so that the other side gives up first.  It is 
difficult to say exactly what resources victims at Waco might have 
had, or what resources other intended victims might have, but for 
purposes of this brief overview I will consider only those that they 
were demonstrated to have or which would have been easily available.  
         Scheduling 
(or strategy) consists of long range and short range 
aspects, and a good scheduler takes both of those into account. During 
the long range scheduling period you determine general considerations 
(e.g. what you hope to accomplish, how you will go about it, what 
tools you will need, how to acquire or substitute for them, etc.).  
Short range strategy is that period of time after one of the instances 
identified in your long range phase has manifested itself, and now you 
begin tailoring your response and preparing applications.  
Applications are, of course, the active conduct of your strategies.
         My previous 
article covered what I believed to be major failings 
in the Waco victims' long range strategies.  They demonstrably hadn't 
really identified and considered their purposes, beyond establishing 
an odd lifestyle, their acquisition of tools was haphazard and poorly 
thought out, they had no prepared contingency plans beyond hunker down 
and hope they'll go away, and their performance did not live up to 
their advertising.  As with many other things in life, they should 
have solved this problem while it was small.
         We've already 
touched on many of the long range scheduling errors 
they made.  One that I hadn't mentioned was a failure to stockpile 
other tools, including a broader variety of communications equipment. 
Ceding their attackers control of the information flow was an 
inexcusable error, both in the short range scheduling and application 
phases. 
         In the short 
range scheduling block, V.S. covered what he believed 
they should have done, and here, lightly edited, is his exceedingly 
well considered view:
             "Call 
    the ATF.  Ask if they're planning to come serve 
    a search warrant.  Volunteer to arrange a meeting time for 
    two agents to come out.  Once they've said they have no 
    interest, inform them this entire conversation is being 
    recorded.  Ask them again if they'd like to come out for a 
    peaceful tour and cup of coffee.  Tell them copies of this 
    tape will be going to the local sheriff, your lawyer, and 
    the local TV station, as evidence that you're willing to 
    bend over backwards to comply with the law.  Ask them if 
    there's anything else bothering them."
         Tool time.  
Video cameras are a must in this modern TV addicted 
age.  People don't want to hear recordings with some still photo up in 
the corner.  They will be much more interested in someone sitting 
calmly at a desk, talking to ATF agents on a speaker phone and 
covering all the bases V.S. mentions.  A couple of highly visible kids 
("Say hi to the nice ATF man, sweetie.") obviously at ease in their 
surroundings wouldn't hurt, either.
         Another set 
of tools would be ham radios and CBs, especially if 
the former incorporate Slow Scan TV capabilities, all the better to 
get your pictures to the networks and public at large.  Cell phones, 
especially if hooked up to computers and thence to the Internet, would 
also fit into this information category.  Remember that the First 
Amendment is first for a reason -- timely information (or the control 
thereof) can be worth crates of ammunition and bundles of rifles. 
Loudspeakers can be a good investment as well, as we'll see in 
applications.
         Yet another 
tool is personal connections.  The more friends and 
associates you have, the greater the number of people who will raise a 
fuss in the media if you're assaulted, the better off you are.  These 
are also people who can help get out information and videos to other 
sources to ensure maximum exposure.  Yes, there may be something 
attractive about the self sufficient exile from society lifestyle -- 
but you can see where that got Randy Weaver.
         V.S. goes 
on to point out, with obvious skill:
             Only 
    then might one want to talk about digging 
    flanking, communicating trenches, digging pits or erecting
    concrete barricades in the driveway and to protect internal 
    living quarters, maintaining a constant, rotating, long-range
    scout-sniper patrol with orders to locate and take out enemy
    command and communication facilities upon the sound of any
    full-scale armed engagement from their rear, the relative 
    merits of 12-gauge buckshot as opposed to black-tip 30.06, 
    etc.
         The government 
has said, over and over again, that the ATF clowns 
at Waco were "ambushed." Wouldn't it be interesting to even do Part II 
as an interview?  Call two military gents with some experience at 
"ambush," which is a fairly specific military term. Like, maybe, 
SEALS.  Give them a scenario:  you know 70 enemy troops, well-equipped 
(including hot, bulky Kevlar) but not very well trained, and without 
much real esprit de corps, are going to be piling out of a cattle 
trailer in broad daylight sometime soon, rushing your front door and 
erecting scaling ladders.  Here's the manpower and weaponry you have 
available.  Draw up a plan which -- with 30 minutes notice -- will 
result in maximum enemy casualties, and minimal friendly losses. 
Estimate enemy casualties after 90 minutes.
         Suggesting 
this particular analysis has merit, although there are 
plenty of books out there that will provide far more depth and detail 
than we would want use in this limited space available here. 
Additionally, in the seamless web of things, I would have little 
difficulty, given 30 minutes warning and the Waco victims resources, 
organizing an ambush that would guarantee, as close as is humanly 
possible, 100% casualties in the advancing light infantry unit.  What, 
though, do you do about the mechanized infantry and armor units that 
follow?  Seems like we're back to long range scheduling again, and yet 
more planning required. 
Thomas J. Creasing is an attorney for the Young Wha Consulting 
Corporation Korea Press Center, 8th Fl. 25, 1-Ka, Taepyung-Ro 
Chung-Ku, Seoul, Korea 100-745. Short Address: KPO Box 106, Seoul 
110-601, Korea. Direct Line: +82 (2) 3700-6881. Fax: +82 (2) 738-2538. 
E-mail: [email protected]